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  This is the story of a recent U.S. Supreme Court case on the use of cost-benefit analysis at the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a regulation issued under the Clean Water 
Act (CWA). The case is Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. The case was not about the 
quality of the cost-benefit analysis, nor the fact that EPA conducted one, but whether EPA had 
CWA authority to base regulatory decisions on cost-benefit. I close with thoughts about an 
alternative Chevron legal test that acknowledges the state of ecosystem valuation. 
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This is the story of a recent case heard in the U.S. 
Supreme Court on the use of cost-benefit analysis 
as applied to a U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) regulation issued under the Clean 
Water Act (CWA). Notwithstanding its charac-
terization in the title, the case is Entergy Corp. v. 
Riverkeeper, Inc., et al. To save economists from 
being disappointed at the end, the case was not at 
all about the quality of the cost-benefit analysis, 
nor the fact that EPA conducted one, but whether 
EPA, also a party to the proceedings, had the au-
thority under the CWA to base its decision making 
in the regulations on cooling water intake struc-
tures on cost-benefit considerations. The story is 
followed by some related observations, and the 
paper closes with my thoughts about the well-
known legal test—the Chevron two-step test—




Both the story and my concluding remarks de-
pend on the legal test applied by the Supreme 
Court, making it helpful to the reader to describe 
the test in some detail. The Constitution grants to 
Congress the power to make laws; in writing 
laws, Congress often instructs agencies to issue 
implementing regulations. Regulated stakeholders 
and other interested parties (often including citi-
zens) may bring suit if they think an agency has 
exceeded its authority as delegated by Congress 
through the statutes. A hallmark of environmental 
statutes in particular is that they grant broad dis-
cretion to agencies such as the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, through vague lan-
guage that may be open to different interpretation 
by different stakeholder groups, and requiring 
resolution [Morganstern (1997, p. 19), quoting 
William D. Ruckelshaus, former EPA Adminis-
trator: “The people who run EPA are not so much 
executives as prisoners of the stringent legislative 
mandates and court decisions that have been laid 
down”]. 
  A case surrounding just such an issue, known 
as Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., et al., made it to the Supreme 
Court in 1984. The case was about the legal 
interpretation of a Clean Air Act clause; the 
Carter administration adopted one interpretation, 
but a few years later the Reagan administration 
adopted (through regulation) a separate one. The 
environmental group, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, sued the EPA and won in the 
lower courts; Chevron appealed the case to the 
Supreme Court, which essentially agreed with 
EPA’s interpretation. Out of the case was born 
one of the most cited legal principles, the so-
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called Chevron two-step test, regarding an agency’s 
authority to interpret a statute. A key paragraph 
from the Supreme Court decision: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the 
statute which it administers, it is confronted with two 
questions. First, always, is the question whether Con-
gress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give ef-
fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. 
If, however, the court determines Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, the court 
does not simply impose its own construction on the stat-
ute, as would be necessary in the absence of an adminis-
trative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute [Chev-
ron 1984, pp. 842–843]. 
  Thus, if the statute is unambiguous, or if the 
agency’s interpretation is not reasonable, the Su-
preme Court, following the precedent it set in the 
Chevron case, will return the case to the lower 
courts. The Chevron test serves as a check to 
keep lower courts from imposing their own inter-
pretations, actions which are viewed as courts 
usurping Congress’s power to make laws—a 
power not granted in the Constitution to the judi-




The CWA established a comprehensive regulatory 
program to “restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s 
waters.” Several elements of this program are the 
prohibition on discharges of pollutants by point 
sources unless authorized, and the authority of the 
EPA and states to issue permits, under the 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES), that regulate discharges from individual 
point sources. Permits are good for a period of 
five years, and may be renewed. Section 316(b) 
of the CWA provides that “any standard … appli-
cable to a point source shall require that the loca-
tion, design, construction and capacity of cooling 
water intake structures reflect the best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact.” This section of the CWA focuses not on 
the discharge of pollutants but on the intake of 
cooling water, although both goals are imple-
mented through the NPDES permit program. 
  Section 316, under the general header of “ther-
mal discharges,” was added to the CWA in 1972. 
In 1976, EPA issued regulations under §316(b), 
which were then challenged by industry, and 
overturned in 1977.
1 As a result of separate litiga-
tion, EPA entered into a consent decree in 1995 
(later amended) which set a timetable for issuing 
regulations under §316(b) in three phases with 
deadlines. The Phase I rule applied to new facili-
ties, and was issued in 2001 (U.S. EPA 2001). The 
Phase II rule applied to existing electric gen-
eration facilities withdrawing at least 50 million 
gallons per day (MGD) of cooling water and was 
issued in 2004 (U.S. EPA 2004a). The Phase III 
rule applied to existing electric generation facili-
ties withdrawing less than 50 MGD, all existing 
manufacturing facilities, and new offshore oil and 
gas extraction facilities, and was issued in 2006 
(U.S. EPA 2006). Prior to these regulations, and 
in the absence of national standards, permit writ-
ers must address §316(b) permit requirements on 
a case-by-case, best professional judgment basis. 
  The Phase II regulation is the focus here be-
cause it was the phase for which litigation 
reached the Supreme Court; however, the Su-
preme Court’s decision effectively applies to 
§316(b) and thus to all three phases. Electric gen-
eration facilities withdrawing at least 50 MGD 
collectively withdraw 214 billion gallons of water 
per day, while all electric generation facilities 
were estimated to account for nearly half of all 
withdrawals of water for all purposes in 1995 
(U.S. EPA 2004a, p. 41586). The Phase II rule 
covered 554 facilities in the United States with-
drawing at least 50 MGD. As the largest with-
drawing facilities in the electricity generation sec-
tor, Phase II facilities are responsible for 90 per-
cent of the cooling water withdrawals from this 
sector (U.S. EPA 2004a, p. 41581).
2 These facili-
ties also represent just over half the electricity-
generating capacity in the United States (U.S. 
EPA 2004b, p. A3-13). 
  Two principal methods of withdrawing cooling 
water are employed: once-through and closed-
cycle cooling. Once-through cooling is as its name 
suggests: cooling water is withdrawn, run through 
the condenser unit, and then discharged back to 
                                                                                    
1 See Section III.C, p. 41582, of the preamble in U.S. EPA (2004a) 
for more background on the historical development of these regula-
tions. Harrington (2009) provides a succinct summary. 
2 For perspective, a facility that operates its cooling water intake 
structure at a rate of 95 MGD would drain an Olympic-sized swimming 
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the waterbody. Closed-cycle cooling recirculates 
water, though it is not a completely closed cycle; 
evaporative losses and/or chemical concentration 
resulting in blow-down require continual with-
drawal of water. Closed-cycle cooling operations 
can reduce cooling water needs by up to 98 per-
cent over once-through systems withdrawing from 
freshwater bodies, and up to 96 percent with-
drawing from saltwater bodies. Whether once-
through or closed-cycle, all intakes have some 
form of screening device at the intake point, to 
prevent trash, debris, and larger fish from being 
taken up with the cooling water. For the most 
efficient heat exchange, condenser tubing is typi-
cally no larger than three-quarters of an inch in 
diameter, and facilities need to keep objects out 
of the condenser system, or the generating unit 
must be shut down. This first level of barrier is 
often referred to as a trash rack. Finer screening 
devices are possible, but to maintain intake flows, 
the intake must then be physically larger. 
  The main closed-cycle cooling technology em-
ploys cooling towers, of which there are two 
types: hyperbolic towers which use the geometry 
of natural air drafts to cool the recirculating cool-
ing water,
3 and mechanical evaporative cooling 
towers which use mechanical fans to push air 
through smaller modular units. Although the ter-
minology is not always consistently used, both 
tower types impose an energy penalty relative to 
once-through cooling. Fans and pumps require 
electricity to operate, meaning net power genera-
tion available for sale is reduced, while reduced 
turbine efficiency due to the warmer temperature 
of recirculated cooling water (relative to once-
through cooling water) during warmer weather 
results in a seasonal loss of peak generation ca-
pacity, depending on, among other things, whether 
or not the condenser is designed for once-through 
or closed-cycle cooling. 
  The basic difference between these two main 
methods of dissipating waste heat—once-through 
and closed-cycle cooling—is that once-through 
systems make greater use of natural capital for 
which the facility does not bear the direct costs, 
                                                                                    
3 Hyperbolic towers are indisputably large and may be seen from 
miles away. They are often taken as symbols of nuclear facilities, but 
some coal-fired closed-cycle plants use hyperbolic towers, while some 
nuclear closed-cycle plants do not; their use at Three Mile Island, site 
of the worst U.S. nuclear accident, in 1979, is perhaps responsible for 
this misconception. 
while the closed-cycle systems require more hu-
man-made (financial) capital investments that can 
be quite costly. In both cases it is society at large, 
and commercial and recreational fishermen in 
particular, that bear the burden of the impacts to 
ecosystems. What are the differences in the envi-
ronmental impacts of these two types of systems? 
  Section 316(b) exists because of the concern 
that the intake of cooling water was causing harm 
to aquatic life, particularly fish and shellfish, of 
all life stages, including eggs, larvae, juveniles, 
and adults. There are two main resulting types of 
harm. Fish longer than three-eighths of an inch 
can be trapped or pinned against standard coarse 
mesh intake screens by the force of the intake 
flow, sustaining injuries from which they do not 
recover, such as descaling. This effect is called 
impingement mortality (IM). Fish smaller than 
three-eighths of an inch in diameter can pass 
through the screens, making a trip through the 
condenser where they are subject to thermal and 
mechanic stresses that result in death. This effect 
is called entrainment (E). Collectively, these im-
pacts are known as IM&E. The focus is restricted 
to organisms that are killed—for entrainment, this 
is nearly always 100 percent of organisms, while 
for impingement, it can be much less than 100 
percent and depends critically on the operation 
and design of the screens (including the through-
screen velocity) and the presence and proper de-
sign and operation of separate fish-friendly re-
turns; investments required to make screens and 
returns fish-friendly are not necessarily very costly. 
  In the Phase I rule, EPA employed a best tech-
nology available (BTA) design standard, that is, 
EPA required new facilities to employ certain de-
sign characteristics, inducing many new facilities 
to employ the capital-intensive closed-cycle cool-
ing. New facilities generally have lower costs for 
the same technology than existing facilities, un-
less the retrofit of technology was anticipated in 
the original design for existing facilities. In the 
suspended Phase II rule, EPA employed a BTA 
performance standard, setting a range of numeric 
performance levels to be achieved, without requir-
ing a specific design, giving facilities more flex-
ibility to determine their approach to compliance. 
  The performance ranges were based on a suite 
of fourteen technologies [really, combinations of 
technologies; U.S. EPA (2004d, p. 2-1)] that re-
sulted in a requirement that facilities reduce im-86    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
pingement mortality by 80 to 95 percent, and en-
trainment by 60 to 90 percent. Furthermore, the 
rule made a distinction between inland facilities 
and estuarine/coastal/Great Lakes facilities by re-
quiring both impingement and entrainment con-
trols at the coastal and Great Lakes facilities, but 
requiring only impingement controls at inland 
facilities. In effect, many of the broadcast spawn-
ing species are marine species, and many nesting 
species are freshwater. However, facilities were 
required to conduct a study to determine the base-
line IM or IM&E levels against which their per-
cent reduction(s) was to be measured. 
  When setting national performance standards 
under a technology-based portion of the statute, 
EPA must demonstrate that these performance 
levels are achievable with technologies that are 
commercially available and economically achiev-
able. A direct quote from the preamble to the sus-
pended Phase II regulation is instructive: 
 
Although closed-cycle, recirculating cooling is not one 
of the technologies on which the performance standards 
are based, use of a closed-cycle, recirculating cooling 
system would always achieve the performance standards 
and therefore, facilities that reduce their flow commen-
surate with closed-cycle, recirculating cooling systems 
are deemed to have met performance standards. … While 
EPA based the requirements of the new facility rule on 
the performance standards of closed-cycle recirculating 
systems, EPA has determined that this technology is not 
economically practicable for many existing Phase II 
facilities [U.S. EPA 2004a, p. 41601]. 
 
  The rule also provided for several compliance 
alternatives for facilities. First, any facility that 
already employed closed-cycle cooling or re-
duced flows commensurate with closed-cycle 
cooling were deemed to be in compliance. Facili-
ties could also use restoration measures to com-
ply—for instance, operating a fish hatchery to re-
store populations of affected species. Facilities 
could use a pre-approved technology, such as fine-
mesh cylindrical wedgewire for freshwater facili-
ties with adequate sweeping velocity, through-
screen velocity of less than 0.5 feet per second, 
and when used for 100 percent of intake flow. 
Facilities could also apply for a cost-cost vari-
ance, where if a facility could demonstrate that 
the facility’s actual costs of compliance were sig-
nificantly greater than the costs EPA estimated 
for that facility at the time of the rulemaking, the 
facility could be subject to less stringent require-
ments. And finally, a facility could apply for a 
cost-benefit variance, by demonstrating that the 
facility’s actual costs of compliance were signifi-
cantly greater than the benefits at that facility. 
EPA specified some requirements for supporting 
analysis for facilities applying for the cost-cost or 
cost-benefit compliance alternative, such as as-
sumptions on discount rates and facility down-
time calculations in the cost-cost case, as well as 
describing the possibility of using a stated prefer-
ence (SP) study to monetize non-use values, and 
perhaps requiring that the SP study undergo peer 
review, although attempting to monetize non-use 
benefits was not strictly required. 
 
Efficiency and the Cost-Benefit Compliance 
Alternative 
 
I will now focus on the cost-benefit compliance 
alternative because it is the one compliance alter-
native directly related to the legal question before 
the Supreme Court. First, in a world of perfect 
information, this compliance alternative is one 
way to ensure an economically efficient regula-
tion. With the aforementioned perfect informa-
tion, one could divide all potentially regulated 
facilities into two groups: those for which adop-
tion of technology generates social benefits (SBi, 
where i denotes the facility) exceeding social costs 
(SCi), and those for which adoption means SCi 
that exceed the SBi generated. Society is clearly 
best off when only the facilities for which SBi > 
SCi adopt the technology and the others do not. 
Why? Add any one facility in the non-adopter 
group, where SBi < SCi , to the set that make the 
technology investments, and social welfare rises 
by SBi − SCi, which is a negative amount; subtract 
any one facility in the adopter group, where SBi > 
SCi, from the set that make the technology invest-
ments, and social welfare falls by SBi  −  SCi, 
which is a positive amount. Thus, classifying 
facilities as to whether their investment adds to 
social welfare or detracts from it provides assur-
ance that society as a whole is as well off with the 
regulation as is possible. 
  Of course, this compliance alternative would 
not be necessary in a world of perfect informa-
tion, if social welfare maximization were really 
the goal, because the regulation would be written 
such that only those facilities where compliance 
is welfare-enhancing would be required to com-
ply in the first place. However, it is well recog-
nized that EPA need only estimate costs in ana-Hewitt  Cost-Benefit Analysis at the Supreme Court: Cooling Water v. Fish   87 
 
 
lyzing regulations, not know costs with precision. 
Thus, this compliance alternative can serve as an 
escape valve for facilities whenever the Agency 
has underestimated their costs, and ensures the 
end result of social welfare maximization—in a 
world of perfect information. 
  Several violations of the perfect information 
assumption cast doubt on the optimality of the 
above general proposition in practice. First, costs 
are much more straightforwardly estimated than 
benefits, and if there are categories of social bene-
fits that cannot be monetized (see below), the re-
sult is monetized social benefits (SBi
$) being an 
underestimate of social benefits (SBi
$ < SBi). This 
means we can no longer be sure that social wel-
fare is maximized when we substitute the rule, 
SBi
$ > SCi, in determining which facilities are re-
quired to comply with the regulation. If we were 
able to additionally require compliance at some of 
the facilities where SBi
$  <  SCi, social welfare 
would still be enhanced, although without mone-
tizing all categories of benefits, we cannot say for 
how many and which facilities this would be true. 
Second, it can be difficult to ascertain the social 
benefits of even those categories that are mone-
tized. The social benefits generated by one facil-
ity may be affected by other facilities located on 
the same waterbody, because benefits generated 
by compliance at one facility may increase with 
compliance at another facility—benefits are cu-
mulative. Another way to say this is that the total 
social benefits of compliance at facilities j and k, 
or SBj+k, is larger than SBj + SBk, when the latter 
represent estimates of benefits generated by 
action taken at each facility only; a similar argu-
ment applies to a single facility over time. In ad-
dition, when a species subject to IM&E is a spe-
cies that migrates, an estimate of benefits based 
on a local study may underestimate true SBi. 
  Third, a facility’s cost of compliance is not 
necessarily equal to the social cost of that facil-
ity’s compliance; the former measures costs from 
the facility’s viewpoint, whereas the latter takes 
society’s viewpoint. (It’s perfectly natural for a 
facility to focus on its compliance costs; but it is 
clearly part of EPA’s responsibility to the general 
public to consider the differences between the 
facility’s viewpoint and the larger social view-
point. Congress certainly anticipated that CWA 
regulations would result in the closure of some 
facilities, though was concerned enough to guard 
against the possibility of widespread closures.) 
There are a number of reasons why the social cost 
could  exceed a facility’s cost of compliance—
e.g., social costs are pre-tax while the facility’s 
costs are after-tax, and facilities do not fully bear 
administrative costs though society does. There 
are also a number of reasons why the social cost 
could be less than a facility’s cost of compliance, 
including that compliance costs assume a pre-
regulation level of output though price effects 
may reduce output (U.S. EPA 2000, pp. 113, 
124–125). Also, facility downtime figures into a 
facility’s compliance costs (through lost operating 
revenue), though other facilities will be dis-
patched to make up the lost production, so that 
this component of social costs consists only of 
any differential in the costs of production at the 
other facilities relative to the complying facility 
(U.S. EPA 2004b, pp. B1-2 to B1-4). Downtime 
estimates of the suspended Phase II rule were 
significant (Harrington 2009, p. 167). To summa-
rize, the relationship between a facility’s compli-
ance costs and the social costs at that facility is 
ambiguous, while the social benefits are larger 
than the monetized benefits. Applying the cost-
benefit variance is thus fraught with far more dif-
ficulty than the theoretical arguments in favor of 





  How did EPA estimate benefits of the sus-
pended regulation? Three metrics were used that 
attempt to capture IM&E losses at all life stages: 
foregone age-1 equivalents, foregone fishery yield, 
and foregone biomass production. The age-1 
equivalent metric is based on data from IM&E 
characterization studies conducted at facilities, 
which produce counts of losses of fish by life 
stage; these counts from sampling episodes of 
certain time periods are then extrapolated to an-
nual losses. These annual losses by life stage are 
then multiplied by a factor that accounts for the 
cumulative probability of survival from that life 
stage to age one, where the cumulative probabil-
ity of survival is based on both natural mortality 
and, for harvested species, harvest mortality as 
                                                                                    
4 See §125.95(b)(6)(i) of the regulation (U.S. EPA 2004a, p. 41690) 
for details on the cost information a facility would have been required 
to submit as part of the cost-benefit compliance alternative; the distinc-
tions between a facility’s compliance costs and social costs were not 
discussed in the regulation. 88    October 2009  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 
 
 
well. Generally, the cumulative survival factors 
used for early life stages (entrainment losses) re-
duce by several orders of magnitude the losses in 
number of organisms when converting to age-1 
equivalents (e.g., dividing by a number in the 
thousands), while for the later life stages, the age-
1 equivalent tends to be a larger number than the 
losses in organism count units. Finally, these nor-
malized losses can be summed to produce an esti-
mate of lost organisms in a metric that does not 
abstract from the high mortality rate of the early 
life stages. However, because so many organisms 
lost are through entrainment of early life stages, 
overall  IM&E losses expressed in age-1 equiva-
lent terms are smaller than counts of organisms. 
  Foregone fishery yield is a measure, in units of 
pounds, of fish that are unavailable for harvest 
due to losses to IM&E. In addition to the kind of 
information used in the age-1 equivalent losses 
calculation, if we have average weight at each age 
and age-specific harvest rates for harvested spe-
cies, we can calculate the lost yield in pounds. 
One doesn’t need to know the population or yield 
of the fishery, only size-at-age and stage or age-
specific rates of natural mortality and fishing 
mortality. If we are willing to assume that IM&E 
don’t affect these rates directly, then yield changes 
are directly proportional to changes in recruit-
ment. This model also depends on the assumption 
that IM&E losses are a minor source of mortality 
in comparison to other sources of mortality (e.g., 
fishing, predation). Foregone yield is then decom-
posed into foregone commercial and foregone 
recreational yields; recreational yields are then 
converted back into count of lost fish. Note that 
this metric covers only recreationally and com-
mercially harvested species. 
  Foregone biomass production uses similar data, 
except that the metric of interest is pounds of 
biomass lost at each life stage, and for all species, 
not just those that are harvested. It is a current 
snapshot measure, including only the weight of 
organisms in their current life stages and the 
foregone growth of these same organisms in the 
year of analysis, and not growth over the ex-
pected lifetime of the organism. Forage fish, 
which may include the very young of recreational 
and commercial species as well as species that are 
never harvested, are also analyzed in this model.
5 
                                                                                    
5 Modeling is more challenging because strict distinctions between 
predator and prey cannot be made on the basis of species alone. 
The foregone production of these fish is also con-
verted to foregone production of commercial and 
recreational fish using a trophic transfer model—
the trophic transfer model requires a factor that 
relates the conversion of forage species to species 
of higher trophic levels (or higher up on the food 
chain). 
  At the time of the analysis to support the Phase 
II rule, EPA had access to IM&E characterization 
studies collected at 46 facilities, spread across 
seven regions of the country (five coastal regions, 
the Great Lakes, and one inland region). The 
study facilities in each region were extrapolated 
to estimate losses at all facilities within the re-
gion, on the basis of observed cooling water in-
take flows (available for all facilities), and ad-
justed for technologies currently in place. Sepa-
rate extrapolations were made for impingement 
and entrainment. 
  Why didn’t EPA simply model fish popula-
tions, including IM&E effects, to see if IM&E 
have an impact on fish populations before devel-
oping the regulation? While this task is not im-
possible, it would have required vastly more re-
sources and time than the Agency had available, 
and is only one of many questions associated with 
this regulation that could have been answered. 
Fish recruitment modeling, as fisheries scientists 
know, is a challenging and fundamental problem 
in fisheries research. Fish are subjected to many 
stressors that are difficult to quantify, and deter-
mining the relative impact of any one stressor 
among the others is generally not possible, mak-
ing it extremely difficult to determine whether a 
stressor has a significant impact on fish popula-
tions or not. There are, however, studies using 
trophic level dynamics that have shown entrain-
ment losses especially to have an impact on the 
production of valued commercial and recreational 
species—for example, losses of bay anchovy and 
silversides affecting striped bass, bluefish, and 
weakfish populations (Summers 1989). This work 
is not readily extended to all species pairings. 
 
The Story, Beginning with Promulgation 
 
The analysis of the suspended Phase II rule is 
detailed in a set of supporting documents (U.S. 
EPA 2004b, 2004c, and 2004d). The rule was ex-
pected to apply to 554 facilities, though some were 
already deemed to be in compliance, and no in-Hewitt  Cost-Benefit Analysis at the Supreme Court: Cooling Water v. Fish   89 
 
 
cremental costs were calculated for these facili-
ties. The 554 facilities were projected to have 
contributed to the loss of 3.4 billion age-1 equiva-
lents each year (a larger number if expressed as a 
count of lost organisms), amounting to 165 mil-
lion pounds of foregone fishery yield (harvested 
fish), or 717 million pounds of foregone biomass 
(including trophic transfer of forage fish to com-
mercial and recreational fish). The rule was ex-
pected to reduce lost organisms as measured on 
an age-1 equivalent basis by 41 percent, foregone 
fishery yield by 39 percent, and foregone biomass 
by 30 percent. Prevention of recreational losses 
was valued using a random utility model, and pre-
vention of commercial losses was valued using a 
producer surplus model where commercial prices 
were assumed not to change. Combined, the pre-
vented recreational and commercial losses repre-
sent just the use value associated with 1.8 percent 
of the total prevented losses of fish, in age-1 
equivalent terms. The remaining 98.2 percent of 
fish—forage fish—were not valued at all because 
non-use benefits were not monetized, and were 
quantified only to the point of describing IM&E 
losses using the three metrics.
6 In addition, im-
pacts on turtles, shellfish, mammals, and birds 
were not monetized. 
  The social costs of the rule were expected to 
be, in 2002 dollars, $389 million annually. The 
monetized benefits of the rule were expected to 
be $83 million annually; the monetized benefits 
are associated with 1.8 percent of the IM&E losses 
in age-1 equivalents. This resulted in a cost-to-
monetized-benefits ratio of 4.7, which is above 
one; a ratio of less than one would indicate that 
society is clearly better off with the rule than 
without, but the converse is not true when poten-
tially significant benefits are not incorporated. A 
break-even analysis of non-use benefits suggested 
that if households in counties with a facility tak-
ing action to comply were willing to pay $5 per 
household annually, this would be sufficient for 
the overall cost-to-benefit ratio to equal one. In 
the end, EPA issued the regulation, although there 
                                                                                    
6 EPA attempted to value non-use benefits, but the various methods 
attempted, each short of conducting a stated preference survey, were 
not ultimately judged to be adequately successful to be included in the 
final analysis. EPA did attempt to conduct a stated preference study to 
capture non-use benefits in the Phase III rulemaking, although a com-
bination of the level of rigor required and the court-ordered deadline 
for the rulemaking ultimately proved decisive in preventing the agency 
from completing the survey. See U.S. EPA 2006 (p. 35017). 
was no specific judgment regarding this break-
even non-use value. 
  EPA articulated a number of considerations in 
determining the best technology available to mini-
mize adverse environmental impacts (see section 
VII of the preamble, U.S. EPA 2004a, pp. 41598–
41610) on which the performance standard was 
based. These considerations include: availability, 
feasibility, flexibility, waterbody type (because 
reproductive strategies differ by waterbody), un-
certainty, cost-effectiveness, economic practica-
bility, approved designs, establishment of national 
performance standards, administrative burdens, 
restoration as a technology, and the potential for 
trading. The rule was signed by the Administrator 
on February 16, 2004, and published in the Fed-
eral Register on July 9, 2004, with an effective 
date of September 7, 2004; after the effective 
date, facilities were expected to comply with the 
rule on the next permit reissuance, though facili-
ties with permits ending within the first four years 
after the publication date were eligible for a three 
and a half year extension to conduct the appropri-
ate studies. 
 
Appeals Court Case 
 
  Under §509 of the CWA, any interested person 
may request a review of EPA actions within 120 
days of promulgation, if the suit is filed in the 
federal Circuit Courts of Appeal. EPA was sued 
by stakeholder groups on all sides of the regula-
tion: environmental groups, industry groups, and 
several states (many states, through demonstrat-
ing that they have the capability, have been dele-
gated the authority to implement the NPDES pro-
gram at the state level). Their cases were con-
solidated into one, which was heard in the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
  In the federal appeals process, the parties suing 
(the petitioners) must first file their briefs, articu-
lating their arguments. Then the party being sued 
(the respondents) files its brief, having the benefit 
of seeing the arguments in the petitioners’ brief. 
Then petitioners get to file a reply brief, having 
the benefit of seeing the arguments in the respon-
dents’ brief. Depending on the court’s schedule, 
filing briefs can take several months. The next 
step is oral argument, which for this case oc-
curred on June 8, 2006. Finally, the court issues 
its written decision, which occurred on January 
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  What arguments did petitioners make? Envi-
ronmental groups argued that restoration was not 
a technology (a point they successfully argued in 
a previous case on the Phase I regulation, also in 
the Second Circuit), that performance ranges 
didn’t require facilities to aim for the highest per-
formance possible within the range, and that cost-
benefit analysis was not permissible under the 
language of §316(b). States argued that because 
closed-cycle cooling was not part of the suite of 
14 technologies on which EPA based its perform-
ance ranges, this meant they could not compel a 
facility to employ closed-cycle cooling to meet 
§316(b) requirements, and argued that closed-
cycle was more effective than the suite of 14 
technologies. Industry argued several procedural 
points but was also motivated to argue for the 
retention of the restoration provision. Industry 
also argued that §316(b) could not apply to ex-
isting facilities because the language of the statute 
says “location” and only new facilities can choose 
location. 
  In their decision, the three-judge panel of the 
Second Circuit “granted in part and denied in 
part” the petition of environmental stakeholders; 
“granted in part, denied in part and dismissed in 
part” the petition of industry stakeholders; and 
finally “remand[ed] to the EPA the provision es-
tablishing BTA” as well as remanding other pro-
visions due to inadequate notice and comment 
opportunity. The Second Circuit cited the Chev-
ron two-step test, as described above, in its 
decision. 
  The Second Circuit determined that the CWA 
language did not allow a cost-benefit comparison, 
because that would be mainly cost driven, rather 
than technology driven (Riverkeeper 2007, p. 
49).
7 The decision also quoted a 1981 Supreme 
Court case, American Textile Manufacturers In-
stitute, Inc. v. Donovan, in which the Supreme 
Court said, “When Congress has intended that an 
agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has 
clearly indicated such intent on the face of the 
statute” (452 U.S. 510; also quoted in River-
                                                                                    
7 Why would EPA have conducted a cost-benefit analysis if it was 
unclear that the statute allowed EPA to do so as part of its decision 
making? The simple answer is that Executive Order 12866 requires a 
cost-benefit analysis for any rule “having an annual impact on the 
economy of $100 million or more,” a threshold passed by even the least 
stringent of the regulatory options—other than no regulation at all—
for this industry. The legal question was whether decision making 
could be based on cost-benefit analysis. 
keeper 2007, p. 23). The court noted that it was 
unclear whether EPA improperly compared costs 
and benefits and whether EPA determined that 
the costs of closed-cycle cooling could not be 
borne by the industry. This was one basis for the 
Second Circuit sending the rule back to EPA. The 
Second Circuit also remanded the cost-benefit 
compliance alternative on the grounds that EPA 
exceeded its authority under the CWA in balanc-
ing costs and benefits.
8 
  The Second Circuit decision was seen as a sig-
nificant victory for environmental groups and a 
significant loss for industry; by having the rule 
remanded, EPA technically lost the case, although 
there were certainly some counterarguments for 
which government prevailed. 
  As part of its arguments, industry suggested 
that restoration was an integral component to the 
rule, and by having both restoration and the cost-
benefit compliance alternatives removed, industry 
thought it lost key flexibilities in the rule, and 
was thus motivated to appeal the decision. Ap-
pealing a federal appeals court decision is to ask 
the Supreme Court to take up the case. Industry 
petitioned the Supreme Court, and was initially 
opposed by environmental stakeholders and the 
U.S. government. (The U.S. government position 
at that point was that the Agency was already 
working on a new version of the rule and that that 
effort ought to be allowed to play out to its con-
clusion, and also—in a cost-benefit balancing 
kind of way—that the legal question posed to the 
Supreme Court was not paramount among the 
many legal questions that might be posed to the 
Court, according to the Solicitor General, who 
represents the U.S. government before the Su-
preme Court.) 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Case 
 
  On April 14, 2008, the Supreme Court granted 
the petition to hear the case (four judges must 
vote to accept a case), and though industry peti-
tioners raised several questions, the Supreme 
Court granted a hearing on one and only one 
question: “whether Section 316(b) of the Clean 
Water Act ... authorizes the EPA to compare costs 
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with benefits in determining the ‘best technology 
available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact’ at cooling water intake structures.” (This 
meant the Supreme Court judged all other mat-
ters, including restoration, to have been settled by 
the Second Circuit decision.) Again, the proce-
dure is for petitioners to prepare their briefs, for 
respondents to prepare theirs with access to the 
former, and for petitioners to file a reply brief. In 
the case before the Supreme Court, the petitioners 
were industry, although once the Supreme Court 
decided to hear the case, the U.S. government 
decided to join with industry in opposing the 
Second Circuit determination that cost-benefit 
was not allowed under §316(b) of the CWA; en-
vironmental stakeholders, affirming the Second 
Circuit decision, became the respondents. Briefs 
were filed, and oral arguments were held on 
December 2, 2008. 
  Any academic who has ever been told “I wish I 
had your job” after being asked how many hours 
a week he or she teaches will appreciate the fol-
lowing: the Supreme Court hears oral arguments 
from early October through the end of May, for 
two hours beginning at 10am on Mondays, Tues-
days, and Wednesdays, but only during the first 
two weeks of each month. Fridays are reserved 
for conference day, which is a meeting of only 
the Justices, where the votes are taken on cases 
heard that week, and writing assignments are 
made for majority and dissenting opinions. Al-
though the Court has been criticized for not ac-
cepting more cases, it’s nonetheless well under-
stood that the Justices’ work goes well beyond 
oral arguments. 
  In the truest meaning of the word, the Supreme 
Court is an awesome place. The courtroom has 
250 seats, some of which may be reserved in ad-
vance through the clerk of the court, while the 
rest are available to the public on a first-come, 
first-served basis beginning at 7:30 am; for high 
profile cases, sidewalk camping increases one’s 
odds of getting in. You go through two metal 
detectors to enter the courtroom. No electronic 
equipment is allowed, though paper for note-tak-
ing is. Transcripts of oral argument will appear on 
the website later in the day (Alderson Reporting 
Company 2008). Dress must be appropriate. You 
are not allowed to slump in your seat. You are not 
allowed to wear glasses on top of your head. The 
courtroom begins to fill shortly after 9am. Clerks 
place paperwork at the Justices’ seats. In all, 24 
briefs had been filed in this case: 7 by petitioners 
and respondents, and 17 as friend of the court 
briefs; all the briefs for this case have a beige 
cover to distinguish them from those of other 
cases. The press sits off to the Justices’ right. 
Nina Totenberg does a story on National Public 
Radio that morning about the case (Totenberg 
2008). The Justices will sit in a row at the front, 
at a raised bench. At 10am sharp, the red curtains 
behind the bench part and the Justices enter, with 
the Chief Justice sitting in the middle, and the 
others on alternating sides from the center in 
order of decreasing seniority. The first order of 
business is the reading of a decision (not the full 
opinion) rendered that day and the swearing in of 
new attorneys to the Supreme Court bar. Then it’s 
on to oral argument, with the government starting 
the case, to be followed by industry, and then en-
vironmental petitioners. 
  The deputy solicitor general starts off by saying 
he has three reasons why the Appeals Court was 
wrong in its application of the Chevron test to this 
case. The first reason is EPA’s thirty years of 
experience considering costs in relation to bene-
fits in permitting decisions.
9 The deputy solicitor 
general is fairly succinct but only gets to reason 
number two before he is interrupted with the first 
question from the bench. Justice Souter questions 
whether cost-benefit can be especially applied at 
the level of a facility, and doesn’t know how to 
judge whether a thousand plankton are worth $1 
million (Alderson Reporting Company 2008, p. 
7). Justice Ginsberg suggests that all agree it’s 
permissible to consider cost. These two justices 
seem to be striving for an answer to the question, 
“how can the benefits of saving eggs and larvae 
be estimated?” 
  But before long, the oral arguments take on an 
Alice in Wonderland like quality to the ear of a 
trained economist. Justice Roberts applies the 
best-technology-available argument to televisions 
and concludes that the TV that most passes the 
cost-benefit test doesn’t do so because it’s cheap 
but because it’s the fanciest TV. A comparison of 
§316b with another part of the CWA causes the 
focus to turn to the word “best” as justifying cost-
benefit analysis. The question then turns to whether 
“minimize” means reduce to the greatest extent 
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Court of Appeals case upholding the Administrator’s decision in a per-
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possible or simply to reduce (and what does 
“reduce” mean?). The meaning of “reasonable” is 
then introduced.
10 
  On to the industry attorney, who suggests that 
this is a Chevron step-one case, and that the first 
step is to decide that the statute does not unambi-
guously foreclose cost-benefit analysis. And now 
Justice Breyer wonders what “practical” means, 
and suggests that Congress was saying “you can’t 
avoid taking into account costs, but don’t do it 
too much” (Alderson Reporting Company 2008, 
pp. 20–21). There’s a bit of discussion about 
EPA’s thirty years of experience taking costs and 
benefits into account in terms of the wholly dis-
proportionate test, though Justice Breyer describes 
it as a grossly disproportionate test, throwing the 
industry attorney somewhat off balance. Justice 
Kennedy asks the industry attorney if it would be 
possible for EPA to require closed-cycle cooling 
under the statute. The industry attorney says no, 
at which point Justice Kennedy suggests that the 
attorney no longer thinks this is a Chevron case. 
  Now it’s the environmental attorney’s turn, and 
he begins by suggesting that the Agency has been 
overstepping the bounds of the CWA for thirty 
years in applying the wholly disproportionate test, 
but immediately suggests that the plain meaning 
of the statute is that there is no possibility under 
EPA’s regulation that a regulated facility could 
have to spend millions of dollars to save just a 
few fish, which turns on the meaning of the word 
“availability.” Justice Alito likens this to reading 
the classifieds and finding a house for sale for 
$50 million and calling that “available” (Alderson 
Reporting Company 2008, p. 31), even though to 
most of us, including Supreme Court Justices, it’s 
clearly not affordable. 
  At one point, Justice Alito suggested that if the 
environmental stakeholders were correct, then 
even costs could not be taken into account. And if 
costs can be taken into account, as everyone 
seemed to have agreed to thus far, then the case is 
really about Chevron step two (was EPA’s inter-
pretation reasonable?), not step one (is the statute 
unambiguous?). Justice Souter asked if the ques-
tion is only whether there is money in the bank to 
pay for the improvements, not whether the money 
in the bank is worth what they’re going to get for 
it. Justice Breyer and the environmental attorney 
                                                                                    
10 The words most commonly used in the transcript (including vari-
ants) in order of appearance are: available, meaning, best, reasonable, 
minimize, and reduce. 
agreed to Senator Muskie’s notion [Alderson Re-
porting Company (2008, p. 43), citing the legis-
lative history] that allowing a cost-benefit com-
parison would result in systematic underregula-
tion that sounded quite reasonable (see above on 
theoretical vs. practical application of the cost-
benefit compliance alternative). But then the en-
vironmental attorney could not articulate the 
checks on EPA’s analysis, except to say that Con-
gress understood that information was not cost-
less, and that by not allowing EPA to make deci-
sions on the basis of cost-benefit would in effect 
afford a better cost-benefit outcome, because the 
Agency wouldn’t be paralyzed by imponderables 
and the rule would be based on “less information 
rather than more information” (Alderson Report-
ing Company 2008, p. 52) (a difficult proposition 
for many environmental economists). Justice Sou-
ter recognized that not allowing cost-benefit 
analysis would in effect mean that the analysis 
would be conducted sub rosa. Chief Justice Rob-
erts quizzed the environmental attorney as to 
whether the Second Circuit’s decision didn’t in 
fact overturn the same court’s decision in the 
Phase I case, where it was held that it is permis-
sible for EPA to reject dry cooling because it was 
too expensive for saving such a small number of 
additional organisms, a cost-benefit argument to 
be sure (ibid., p. 58). 
  On April 1, 2009, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision (Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., et 
al.), deciding 6 to 3 that the EPA has the author-
ity to use cost-benefit comparisons in §316(b) 
regulations. Justice Scalia wrote the majority 
opinion, joined by four others. Justice Breyer 
wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, while Justices Ginsburg and Souter 
joined the dissenting opinion written by Justice 
Stevens. 
  The majority opinion reminds us that if the 
statute is ambiguous, then the Chevron test re-
quires courts to ask if an agency’s interpretation 
of the statute is a reasonable one, and not whether 
it is the only possible interpretation or even the 
most reasonable one using a court’s judgment. By 
noting that where Congress intended to have a 
particular impact (such as the eventual elimina-
tion of pollution discharges), and looking to other 
places in the CWA for language, Congress tended 
to say so clearly. The Supreme Court also 
articulated that even if all agree that the statute 
does not require EPA to consider cost-benefit 
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permitted to do so.
11 The Justices also noted that 
there has been 30 years’ time during which the 
Agency has implemented a variant of cost-benefit 
balancing (the test of whether costs are wholly 
out of proportion to benefits in permitting), and 
while not determinative, this certainly suggests 
the reasonableness of this interpretation of the 
statute. And finally the Justices noted that even 
respondents and the Second Circuit admitted that 
limited cost-benefit balancing was an appropriate 
interpretation of the statute, thus conceding the 
main point of the case. Hence, the Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court’s decision, remanding 
the case for further proceeding consistent with the 
Supreme Court decision. 
  Justice Breyer’s separate opinion confirms that 
he agrees with the majority that a cost-benefit 
comparison is permissible, although he suggests 
that the text of the law is somewhat restricting. 
He thinks that the sponsors feared that cost-bene-
fit analysis would emphasize easily quantifiable 
factors over more qualitative factors, in particular 
the value of preserving nonmarketable species of 
fish. He supports the use of a wholly dispropor-
tionate test. However, in the Phase II rule, EPA 
changed the wording from the historical usage of 
“wholly disproportionate” to “significantly greater 
than,” without adequate justification for the switch. 
  The main point of Justice Stevens’ opinion for 
the dissenting group is that while the CWA neither 
explicitly prohibits nor explicitly authorizes a 
cost-benefit comparison, it nonetheless suggests 
that if a technology is available and performs 
better than other available technologies (“avail-
able” allows taking costs into consideration), then 
it must be deemed BTA under the statute. And 
that because other portions of the CWA explicitly 
suggest whether costs and benefits are to be com-
pared, the silence in this portion of the statute is 
determinative, because Congress has not dele-
gated to the Agency the authority to make a cost-
benefit comparison. Another way to say this—
articulated by many in the environmental com-
munity and not simply in relation to this case—is 
that Congress had already undertaken the most 
basic cost-benefit calculus when deciding to in-
clude a technology-based paragraph in §316(b) of 
the statute (see Alderson Reporting Company 
                                                                                    
11 Also in the majority opinion (Entergy 2009, p. 13), the Supreme 
Court allowed that there might be arguments against “a rigorous form 
of cost-benefit analysis” but noted that this was not the legal question 
posed to it. 
2008, p. 40; Riverkeeper 2007, p. 49; and Kysar 
2009), and therefore did not delegate to the 
Agency the authority to base regulatory decision 
making on cost-benefit grounds. 
  Where are things now? In principle, the Second 
Circuit must revise its decision in light of the Su-
preme Court decision. However, EPA was al-
ready in the process of developing a new rule, 
and can continue doing so while taking the Su-
preme Court’s decision into account, since the 
decision places no additional limitations or re-
quirements on the Agency. EPA cannot simply 
reinstate the original Phase II rule, because there 
were issues besides the cost-benefit comparison 
in the Second Circuit’s decision that were re-
manded to the Agency, and the Supreme Court 




Friend of the Court Briefs 
 
Earlier I noted that there were 17 friend of the 
court briefs filed in this case. Two of these were 
submitted by groups of economists—one in sup-
port of petitioners, and the other in support of re-
spondents. First, the brief supporting the use of 
cost-benefit analysis (Arrow et al. 2008); this 
brief was filed by 33 economists, including three 
Nobel Prize winners, several former members of 
the President’s Council of Economic Advisers, 
and many well-published environmental econo-
mists. I knew I had spent a lot of time working 
with attorneys and reading legal briefs when upon 
reading this one, I found it unpersuasive, despite 
agreeing with nearly everything it said. It was 
unpersuasive because it did not directly address 
the legal question before the Supreme Court [in-
deed, as much as said so (Arrow et al. 2008, p. 
3)], but rather whether the statute should have 
given EPA the authority to consider costs and 
benefits, and not just in the portion of the statute 
at issue, but in the CWA as a whole as well as 
other environmental statutes. That is not a ques-
tion the Supreme Court would ever answer, the 
Constitution clearly having granted to Congress 
and only to Congress the power to make laws. 
Their message would have been better directed at 
Congress than at the Supreme Court. 
  These economists deemed the Second Circuit’s 
opinion economically unsound, concluding that 
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order to make rational decisions, and to do so in a 
transparent fashion. These economists were not 
arguing that cost-benefit analysis ought to be the 
only decision making rationale, and noted the 
great difficulties associated with comparing quan-
titative and qualitative information. Perhaps the 
most intriguing portion of their brief is their 
quotation of a letter written by Benjamin Frank-
lin, describing a method for making private deci-
sions that he called a “Moral or Prudential Alge-
bra.” This essentially involved listing the pros 
and cons of a certain decision, giving appropriate 
weights to each factor, and then determining their 
balance. Franklin advises this approach for im-
proving rationality, because difficult cases be-
come difficult due to the challenge of keeping all 
the relevant factors in mind at one time. Formal 
cost-benefit analysis as we know it today is 
clearly one form of Franklin’s moral algebra. 
Rare, however, is the modern example where 
qualitative factors are also formally listed in cost-
benefit analysis. 
  The second brief has fewer signatories, but 
nonetheless includes many well-published au-
thors, names recognizable to those who follow 
the ecological economics literature. Like the dis-
senting opinion on the Supreme Court, this group 
takes the position that Congress had already con-
ducted the only cost-benefit calculus necessary in 
compelling EPA to issue technology-based regu-
lations for cooling water intake structures [“the 
benefits of cooling water intake regulation are 
sufficiently vast and difficult to quantify that only 
the ‘best’ control technology will suffice” (Ac-
kerman et al. 2008, p. 37)]. That EPA was to de-
termine whether the best technology was also 
economically available is viewed in this brief as a 
check on the Agency, principally to address dis-
tributional considerations, such as numerous plant 
shutdowns. These economists remind us that cost-
benefit analysis can shed light on the allocative 
efficiency of a program, but only in a Kaldor-
Hicks sense rather than a Pareto-optimal fash-
ion.
12 Also, basing benefits estimation on a will-
                                                                                    
12 The Kaldor-Hicks criterion states that if benefits of a policy exceed 
costs of a policy, then it is possible for the winners to compensate the 
losers, leaving everyone better off. Note that the possibility of compen-
sation, and not the actual compensation, is all that is required for a pol-
icy to be Kaldor-Hicks–efficient. The Pareto criterion, on the other 
hand, suggests that a policy will improve social welfare (and should be 
undertaken) if it makes no one worse off, and makes at least one per-
son better off. All Pareto-efficient programs would be Kaldor-Hicks–
efficient, but the converse is not true. 
ingness-to-pay (WTP) approach means that the 
results are contingent on the underlying distribu-
tion of wealth from which the WTP valuations are 
deduced. They cite Amartya Sen by way of criti-
cizing the stated preference approach to mone-
tization (and would prefer a cost-effectiveness 
analysis instead). Finally, they suggest that cost-
benefit, while promoting rational decision mak-
ing, is not so integral to the Constitution as to be 
read into all of our statutes. 
  These economists also point out that a cost-
benefit analysis does not determine whether a 
technology is economically available—that de-
termination comes from conducting a financial 
analysis of whether the firm has the cash flow to 
cover the annualized expenses associated with 
technology, or not (in which case the facility 
would likely shut down), and aggregating over 
firms. They present two examples in support of 
this argument: an economically efficient technol-
ogy (benefits exceed the costs) that is not eco-
nomically available (firms do not have cash flow 
to cover annualized costs of technology, and can’t 
stay in business), and an economically available 
technology that is not economically efficient (the 
technology is available, but a cost-benefit analy-
sis would suggest against its adoption). Finally, 
these economists argue that EPA’s cost-benefit 
analysis was flawed by not including non-use 
value, or indeed any value for 98.2 percent of the 
lost age-1 equivalents of all species. This brief 
was more compelling in terms of addressing the 
actual legal question at issue. 
 
Others Who Have Opined 
 
In a recent “Resources for the Future” volume on 
better regulatory review, Farrow (2009) reiterated 
a point made by the NOAA
13 panel on contingent 
valuation about following the faint behavioral 
trails, instead of attempting to monetize non-use 
benefits. Unfortunately, as Farrow points out (p. 
183), even the faint behavioral trails that have 
revealed themselves in this instance—manatee 
viewing and recreational fishing near the warm 
water outfalls associated with once-through cool-
ing—would not necessarily be uniformly viewed 
as beneficial. Assuming these faint behavioral 
trails are associated with environmental benefits 
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favors the protection of recreational species (in 
many cases, nonnative species) and easy access to 
endangered species over forage fish and the natu-
ral functioning of aquatic ecosystems. Indeed, 
Kysar (2009) notes a general dissatisfaction with 
the assumption that “natural and human-made 
capital are generally substitutable” (pp. 201–202) 
that is central to neoclassical environmental eco-
nomics approaches to cost-benefit analysis. 
 
A Common Denominator Between the Second 
Circuit and the Supreme Court 
 
The Second Circuit case was heard by a three-
judge panel, but the decision was written by 
Judge Sonia Sotomayor. She recently replaced 
Justice Souter on the Supreme Court. While this 
is a decision she wrote that was subsequently 
overturned by the Supreme Court, it should be 
noted that this has happened to every circuit court 
of appeals judge elevated to the Supreme Court. 
She was also the judge who engaged in the most 
vigorous questioning during oral arguments in the 
Second Circuit. 
 
Having Attorneys and Judges Who Really 
Understand Economics 
 
On the day of oral arguments at the Supreme 
Court, I ran into an economist I know from our 
overlapping days in graduate school. She was 
there with her law school class, now being a stu-
dent at a local law school—her professor just 
happened to have picked a day for which she 
would be able to follow the arguments even with-
out reading any briefs. This is noteworthy be-
cause she is on a scholarship in a program aimed 
specifically at attracting Ph.D. economists to law 
school, in an effort to expand the ranks of profes-
sional lawyers who understand economics not 
just at the undergraduate level, but at the post-
graduate level, where the true complexities of 
economics are studied. 
 
 
The Chevron Test Redux 
 
In this closing section, I express my dismay that 
the legal question of authority to compare costs 
and benefits rests on only two possible states of 
the world in the first part of the Chevron test. The 
two states of the world in the Chevron step-one 
test are that Congress was either unambiguous or 
not as regards intent, with ambiguity seen as 
delegating decision making to the agency. But 
this approach still very much leaves open to in-
terpretation the question of silence in regards to 
cost-benefit, as is obvious with the dramatically 
differing interpretations brought by the govern-
ment and industry, and environmental groups. 
Each, heard individually, makes sense and is plau-
sible on its face, which is hardly determinative 
(Morganstern 1997, pp. 15–16). Yet, the court was 
forced to choose; this court made a choice that 
most would have predicted; a different court 
could easily arrive at a different decision. This 
isn’t a particularly satisfying result to accept, not 
for economists anyway, though perhaps ac-
ceptable to attorneys who are trained to think in 
such terms. 
  There is a more plausible description of the 
relevant states of the world. The relevant states of 
the world are that Congress prohibits cost-benefit 
considerations in decision making, Congress ex-
plicitly requires cost-benefit comparisons, and 
Congress is silent in regards to cost-benefit.
14 
Through a review of environmental statutes for 
examples of the two former cases, it will perhaps 
become more apparent what silence may truly 
imply. Even the Supreme Court in its articulation 
of the Chevron two-step test—perhaps because it, 
too, was a case involving interpretation of an en-
vironmental statute—starts with the unambiguous 
case, and then describes its opposite using the 
phrase “silent or ambiguous,” making no further 
distinction between a permissible construction 
from ambiguity and a permissible construction 
from silence. 
  The 1994 Congressional elections saw the 
House of Representatives switch from a Democ-
ratic majority to a Republican majority for the 
first time in 40 years, due in part to the Republi-
can Party’s national election effort known as the 
Contract with America. Two ideas contained in 
the Contract with America that were in legislation 
not enacted were to impose on regulatory agen-
cies a requirement to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis for major rulemakings, and to have such 
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ing, where that list neither contains cost-benefit analysis, nor contains 
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analyses reviewed by the Office of Management 
and Budget (both codifying parts of Executive 
Order 12866).
15 At the time, there were also calls 
for legislation to contain a prohibition on regula-
tions for which benefits were exceeded by costs. 
These proposals spurred at least two efforts to 
describe the current legal status of conducting   
cost-benefit analysis by taking a broad look 
across all the environmental statutes that EPA is 
charged with implementing. See Schierow (1994) 
and Morganstern (1997) for more details, al-
though I will briefly summarize the findings of 
both authors here. 
  Schierow (1994) was more focused on whether 
the consideration of costs was statutorily author-
ized, rather than the larger question of whether 
cost-benefit analysis was authorized; however, 
she cataloged statutes according to both. She 
noted also that: 
 
Although generally characterized as a scientific activity, 
risk analysis is not, and probably can never be, entirely 
objective or fact-based. Risk analysis was developed to 
evaluate what is known about things that cannot be 
known with certainty. … Because these choices cannot 
be based on science alone, they are subject to challenge. 
 
She found that most environmental statutes al-
lowed or even required the analysis of risk, and 
that many allowed or required the consideration 
of costs as well, although examples of both could 
be found, even within the same statute. For in-
stance, the Clean Air Act (CAA) requires the Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) to 
be set on the sole basis of risk to human health—
that is, the NAAQS represent the lofty and aspira-
tional goals of the CAA—while the various emis-
sion standards sections of the CAA for hazardous 
air pollutants and vehicle emissions allow consi-
deration of both risk and costs—that is, the imple-
menting standards EPA determines to guide the 
nation to achieving its lofty and aspirational goals. 
The CWA has a similar construction between the 
§101(a) national goals and §303 water quality cri-
teria—the lofty and aspirational goals—and water 
quality standards and effluent guidelines limita-
                                                                                    
15 Two successful pieces of legislation that passed under the Contract 
with America that affect EPA’s analysis of regulations today were the 
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (making 
judicially reviewable the Agency’s conduct of requirements under the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980) and the Unfunded Mandates Re-
form Act of 1995. 
tions—two implementing programs in which costs 
may also be explicitly considered. 
  Though perhaps somewhat less numerous than 
the explicit prohibition cases where even costs 
cannot be taken into account, there are likewise 
examples where Congress has explicitly com-
pelled EPA to conduct cost-benefit analysis. Sec-
tion 812 of the CAA requires EPA to publish a 
report enumerating the costs and benefits of the 
entire CAA program; the first report was a retro-
spective report, while subsequent reports were to 
take a prospective look at the CAA programs’ 
costs and benefits (U.S. EPA 1997, 1999). 
  The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Roden-
ticide Act (FIFRA) requires the Agency to register 
only those pesticides “without unreasonable ad-
verse effects on the environment,” while “taking 
into account the economic, social, and environ-
mental costs and benefits of the use of any pesti-
cide.” Note however that while FIFRA is consid-
ered a cost-benefit statute, the benefit of a pesti-
cide is generally understood to be its effective-
ness relative to substituted pesticides that would 
be used if the particular pesticide were not ap-
proved for registration. 
  The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) al-
lows the EPA to consider “a comparison of the 
estimated costs of complying ... and the relative 
efficiency ... to protect against such risk of in-
jury” in §6 regulations of chemicals, although 
parts of TSCA are self-implementing and there are 
few regulations issued under TSCA relative to 
other environmental statutes, limiting the effec-
tiveness of the cost-benefit provision. Key provi-
sions have been added to TSCA over the years to 
cover asbestos, indoor radon, and lead-based paint 
regulations, where the first and last of these fo-
cused specifically on the health of children or 
school-aged children. 
  As Morganstern (1997, p. 8) notes, several stat-
utes require that “costs must be reasonable,” but 
that courts have held that a formal cost-benefit 
analysis is not required to meet that standard. 
Table 1 in Morganstern (1997, p. 9) summarizes 
his review of statutes. His general conclusion was 
that “Various statutes forbid, inhibit, tolerate, al-
low, invite or require the use of economic analy-
sis in environmental decisionmaking” (p. 20). 
  The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) was last 
amended in 1996 (subsequent to Schierow’s 1994 
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suing or revising any National Primary Drinking 
Water Regulations (NPDWR), and the maximum 
contaminant levels (MCLs) that are the primary 
regulatory tool in NPDWRs, to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis and to determine whether the 
benefits justify the costs; this is generally under-
stood to not require that monetized benefits ex-
ceed costs. 
  More recently, the Center for Progressive Re-
form (CPR) conducted a comprehensive review of 
health, safety, and environmental statutes in re-
gards to the degree to which agencies may 
consider costs or costs and benefits in issuing 
implementing regulations in developing recom-
mendations related to President Obama’s call for 
comments on an executive order to revise E.O. 
12866 (CPR 2009). They classify statute sections 
into five distinct categories and one hybrid: tech-
nology-based, effects-based, phased bans, multi-
factor balancing, cost-benefit, and technology-
based/cost-benefit hybrid (see their table, “Only 
Two Statutory Provisions Protecting Health, 
Safety, and the Environment Call for Cost-Bene-
fit Analysis”). They note that Congress generally 
anticipated that costs would be considered in 
technology-based statutes [CWA and CAA feature 
prominently, with the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) also among the environ-
mental statutes listed], while costs are often for-
bidden from being taken into account with ef-
fects-based statutes (also CWA and CAA and En-
dangered Species Act).
16 Phased bans are seen as 
a special case of effects-based statutes where 
Congress recognized that much higher costs are a 
consequence of an immediate ban, hence the 
phasing (CAA and TSCA). Multi-factor balancing 
statutes often list both costs and benefits as fac-
tors, along with others that must be considered, 
such that a strict cost-benefit balancing is unlikely 
to be determinative [Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), FIFRA, and TSCA]. SDWA is the 
only statute CPR lists in the technology-based/ 
cost-benefit hybrid category (EPA may use a 
cost-benefit rationale in deviating from technol-
ogy-based standards). And finally, only non-envi-
ronmental statutes are included in their cost-bene-
fit category: the Consumer Product Safety Act, 
                                                                                    
16 Morganstern (1997) and CPR (2009) differ on whether cost-benefit 
reasons are allowed in setting Clean Air Act standards for new sources. 
and the Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partner-
ship Act. 
  To summarize this review, notice that the ex-
plicit requirements to undertake cost-benefit analy-
sis are all associated with statutes that are largely 
aimed at protecting human health: CAA new 
source standards, CAA §812 reports, SDWA MCLs, 
TSCA chemicals, and FIFRA pesticide registra-
tions. Based on these existing reviews of envi-
ronmental statutes, I have found no examples 
where the main objective of the statute is to pro-
tect ecosystems rather than human health, and 
where cost-benefit analysis is either required or 
even explicitly permitted. 
  The Supreme Court articulated the Chevron test 
used in this case in the first place, and they are 
presumably free to revise the test according to 
sound judicial principles and the Constitution. 
What would a revised test look like? Despite my 
lack of legal training, I offer one possibility, 
which is a three-part test. The first part remains 
the same: “is the statute unambiguous?” This part 
remains consistent with the lower courts’ predi-
lection to use plain language constructions. The 
second part represents the critical diversion from 
the original Chevron test, and is a new step to be 
inserted. In the second step, the court would ask, 
“is there a pattern or trend to be gleaned from the 
class of statutes to which the statute at issue in the 
current proceedings belongs that would guide 
interpretation of the ambiguous language?” This 
step takes into account the coherence of Con-
gress’s intent as expressed over time (e.g., SDWA 
and its amendments) or over the span of a class of 
statutes (e.g., environmental law in general). This 
coherence of Congress may not be clearly or ex-
plicitly articulated—and I mean purposefully so, 
rather than through neglect—in a specific statute. 
This step is somewhat akin to taking the legisla-
tive history into account when determining the 
reasonableness of an interpretation relative to 
Congress’s intent; EPA usually looks to the leg-
islative history for guidance whenever a statute is 
open to interpretation, although the legislative 
history does not legally constrain Agency actions. 
Inserting this step is a warranted recognition of 
the inherent difficulty of addressing issues for 
which consensus is difficult—ultimately, Con-
gress leaves out the parts that can’t be agreed 
upon, and includes the parts that can be agreed 
upon in language. Also, this step recognizes that 
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in a section or sections of a statute, while a larger 
agency is (or multiple agencies are) generally 
responsible for carrying out the suite of programs 
anticipated by a statute. It is at the agency level 
that more attention is paid to making sure that the 
individual regulations are consistent with broader 
policy goals, including trends in statutes or 
statutory interpretation. 
  The final step in this modified Chevron test is a 
slight variant on the original: “if the answer to 
step two is no, the question is whether the 
Agency’s interpretation is reasonable, while if the 
answer to step two is yes, the question becomes 
whether the Agency’s interpretation is reasonable 
in light of the gleaned pattern or trend.” This test 
is workable, because once articulated, it would be 
a relatively straightforward determination as to 
how well the parties to a judicial proceeding ad-
dressed these questions. Indeed, Agencies could 
build an administrative record to demonstrate the 
degree to which they believe deference should be 
granted. 
  How would application of this modified Chev-
ron test be applied in Cooling Water v. Fish? The 
same result would obtain in step one: the statute 
is ambiguous by virtue of its silence. Environ-
mental stakeholders, a party disagreeing with the 
outcome of the Supreme Court decision, could 
agree with this characterization, because their true 
concern is really the result of step two of the 
modified Chevron test. In step two, stakeholders 
would be free to discern their own patterns, and 
there is no guarantee that the pattern I discerned 
above would be the prevailing one. The important 
aspect of this step is that it forces stakeholders 
engaged in an adversarial process to articulate the 
patterns or trends, rather than depend on agencies 
in the course of their work (outside an adversarial 
process) to divine interpretations from the vague 
language of one statute. This would also invite 
stakeholders to go beyond the inevitable compari-
son of Congress’s work to sausage-making. Step 
three retains the useful and important function of 
serving as a check against arbitrary and capri-
cious behavior on the part of agencies. 
  A plausible interpretation of the silence in CWA 
§316(b) on cost-benefit is that it is simply a re-
flection—taken over the period in which envi-
ronmental statutes have been enacted—of a gen-
eral recognition that there is more readily avail-
able data as well as consensus on valuation meth-
ods when valuing improvements to human health 
than in ecosystems. The recent EPA Science Ad-
visory Board’s Committee on Valuing the Pro-
tection of Ecological Systems and Services (C-
VPESS) report (Science Advisory Board 2009) 
focused on improving the practice of ecosystem 
valuation. While the courts may argue that silence 
means that Congress has effectively delegated to 
the Agency the authority to interpret statutes to 
determine whether cost-benefit analysis can be 
used in regulatory decision making, the Agency is 
in a weaker position in regards to ecosystem 
benefits than human health benefits. A stronger 
legal test would shine a light directly on the need 
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